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repeated attempts to falsify them, make detailed and novel
predictions about previously unobserved phenomena that
are subsequently confirmed, predict new observations that
falsify rival theories, fit coherently and even deductively
with other established theories, and economically account
for large bodies of known phenomena. A number of
evolutionary psychological hypotheses have met all the
criteria of successful scientific theories, including our
proposal that the human mind contains (1) an evolved
neurocognitive system that is functionally specialized for
reasoning about social exchange, with a subroutine for
detecting cheaters (social contract theory (SCT) [1–8]), and
(2) an evolved neurocognitive system that is specialized for
reasoning about precautions in hazardous situations
(hazard management theory (HMT) [8]). By contrast, the
Buller–Fodor counterhypothesis, constructed post hoc to
retrodict a small subset of our results, has been repeatedly
and decisively falsified by many researchers over the past
fifteen years. These diverse experimental falsifications
(which Buller fails to disclose [9]) are not hidden in obscure
sources, but are prominently featured in publications that
Buller cites on other points. Specifically:
Because social contract rules involve the deontic concept
of obligation, all social contracts are deontic rules (but,
crucially,not all deontic rules aresocial contracts).Following
Fodor, Buller claims (incorrectly) that the main source of
evidence for a cheater-detection specialization involves
experiments that compare deontic conditionals with indica-
tive ones. He argues that deontic conditionals ‘have’ a
different logical form from indicatives and when social
contracts elicit better violation detection than indicative
conditionals, this is a ‘logic effect’, general to deontic rules,rather than a content effect specific to social contract rules.
The Buller–Fodor hypothesis makes a clear prediction: good
performance (high levels of violation detection) will be found
across a broad range of deontic rules, rather than just among
the narrower subsets of deontic rules, like social contracts
and precautions, that were evolutionarily significant. This
key prediction is demonstrably false. As numerous exper-
iments show, subjects perform poorly on deontic rules – even
natural, familiar ones – when these do not resemble social
contracts or precautions (Ref. [2] pp.229–233, 238–240, 243–
253; [3,10].
Indeed, using SCT and HMT we were able to predict
and produce patterns of reasoning strikingly at variance
with any that had been observed before, as well as show
that their appearance and disappearance parametrically
tracks manipulations of several theoretical variables that
are central to SCT and HMT but irrelevant to rival
theories (including Buller’s). For example, as predicted by
SCT, identical social contracts elicit good performance
when violations might be intentional (and so reveal
cheaters), but elicit poor performance when violations
are innocent mistakes (and therefore cannot) [4,7].
Because two identical social contracts must necessarily
have the same deontic logical form, Buller’s hypothesis
(incorrectly) predicts uniform and high performance across
both conditions.
Similarly, social exchanges by their nature restrict
access to benefits, and so one can transform an otherwise
identical deontic rule from a social contract into an
ordinary permission rule by parametrically changing the
permitted action from a benefit to something neutral or
unpleasant. As predicted by SCT (but contrary to Buller’s
hypothesis), performance plummets on the deontic rule to
the degree the permitted action becomes less interpretable
as a benefit [3].
Update TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.9 No.11 November 2005506If a single deontic reasoning system handles deontic
social contracts and deontic precautions, then performance
on both should be impaired by neural damage to that
system. But if they are handled by two distinct neurocog-
nitive systems, as predicted by SCT and HMT, then neural
trauma could cause a dissociation. Buller’s hypothesis fails
again: focal brain damage can selectively impair social
contract reasoning while leaving precautionary reasoning
intact [5]. This dissociation within the domain of deontic
rules has recently been replicated using neuroimaging [6].
Interpretations of social contract rules track SCT’s
domain-specialized inference procedures: in [8],
we refuted Buller-style logic explanations of social
contract results for perspective change, switched rules,
and ‘wants’ problems – facts he fails to mention, let alone
discuss. Buller’s systematic inattention to large bodies of
findings that conflict with his assertions is not due to lack
of space in TICS – the pretence that these findings do not
exist pervades his book, and its treatment of many areas of
evolutionary psychology. (For further analysis, see www.
psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/buller.htm)
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jealousy as a pathology, social construction, or by-product
of capitalist society, manifested identically in men and
women [1]. Evolutionary psychologists, in contrast, hypoth-
esized that jealousy is an evolved adaptation, activated by
threats to a valuable relationship, functioning to protect it
from partial or total loss [2–4]. Because the reproductive
consequences of infidelity and partner loss are parallel for
men andwomen insomerespects, andasymmetric in others,
the sexes were predicted to have similar psychologies in
some respects, and different psychologies where their
adaptive problems recurrently diverged. This program
initially focused on a few core design features of jealousy,
but has since expanded to study many more.
Sexual similarities include the following. Jealousy (i) is
an emotion designed to alert an individual to threats to a
valued relationship, (ii) is activated by the presence of
interested and more desirable intrasexual rivals, and (iii)
functions, in part, as a motivational mechanism with
behavioral output designed to deter ‘the dual specters ofinfidelity and abandonment’ ([1], p. 35). (iv) ‘[B]oth sexes
are hypothesized to become distressed over sexual and
emotional infidelity’ because both forms of infidelity
provide important cues to the loss of reproductively
valuable resources ([4], p. 251). When there is a
discrepancy in mate value, (v) the lower-value partner
will experience more intense jealousy [1].
There are at least 13 distinct hypothesized sex-
differentiated design features, and 13 out of 13 have
been confirmed empirically. Men and women differ
psychologically in the weighting given to sexual and
emotional cues that trigger jealousy, such that (i) men
more than women become upset at signals of sexual
infidelity, which portend both paternity uncertainty and
loss of reproductive resources to a rival; and (ii) women
more than men become upset at signals of a partner’s
emotional infidelity, which threaten a loss of commitment
and resources to a rival [1,5].
When jealousy is activated by interlopers, (iii) women
become especially distressed by threats from physically
attractive rivals, whereas (iv) men become especially
distressed by rivals with more resources [6]. Within
